An economic theory of Islamic finance by Al-Jarhi, Mabid
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
An economic theory of Islamic finance
Mabid Al-Jarhi
INCEIF
20 July 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72698/
MPRA Paper No. 72698, posted 24 July 2016 06:17 UTC
 
 
 
 
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF ISLAMIC 
FINANCE 
MABID ALI AL-JARHI 
PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, INCEIF, THE  
GLOBAL UNIVERSITY OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
  
ABSTRACT 
We have demonstrated by using macroeconomic, 
banking and finance theories that Islamic finance, 
when applied according to our paradigm (Al-Jarhi, 
1981) would have distinct advantages. In addition, it 
provides a justifiable prescription for reforming the 
contemporary market economy. 
The advantages of Islamic finance formulated above, 
although noteworthy, are not sufficient to induce 
Islamic bankers to be true to Islamic finance. The 
reason is that such advantages are mostly external and 
can only induce behavior after being internalized. An 
important policy implication is that such 
internalization is left to banking and finance 
regulators. Only when the license of Islamic banking is 
strictly enforced by the monetary authority that Islamic 
bankers would stop mimicking conventional finance. 
Our main policy implications are only one headline that 
requires more detailed explanation that is found 
somewhere else (Al-Jarhi, 2014). In addition, some 
Islamic finance contracts require special guidelines in 
order to reduce the amount of information asymmetry 
associated with them. In addition, certain 
modifications have to be introduced to the corporate 
governance of Islamic banks, especially in allowing 
investment account holders to be represented on their 
boards of directors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Conventional finance, based on the classical loan 
contract, has been practiced in the ancient world for 
centuries. Only in the seventeenth century, it has been 
institutionalized in the form of banks as we know 
today. Meanwhile, interest-free Islamic finance has 
started with the dawn of Islam, based on a number of 
investment and finance contracts. Yet, despite its 
continued application, it has not taken the form of 
banking until 1975 (Chachi, 2005). The longer 
experience with conventional finance and its wide-
ranging prevalence in the world, raises questions 
regarding the economic rationale of Islamic finance.  
Islamic jurisprudence offers little in this regard, beyond 
the concept of justice underlying the prohibition of 
interest. In economics, there is a need to present 
Islamic finance as a choice or alternative to 
conventional finance. Such need becomes more 
obvious as Islamic finance involves higher contractual 
and transactions costs. Instead of using one 
standardized contract, like the classical loan contract, 
it uses up to sixteen contracts with the possibility of 
mixing and matching in some financing transactions.   
This paper, uses results drawn from price, monetary, 
banking and finance theories to compare both 
conventional and Islamic finance in order to ascertain 
whether the latter has concrete advantages for the 
single bank and/or the macro economy to justify its 
use. The paper lists certain economic advantages that 
makes Islamic finance the better choice. However, this 
does not mean that Islamic finance will automatically 
become the choice of banks and financial institutions. 
First, its advantages cannot be captured by individual 
banks, as they are mostly external to the individual 
decision-making units. Without ways to internalize 
such external effects, banks will find little incentives to 
seek macroeconomic benefits that bear only indirectly 
on their financial statements. Second, policymakers 
must be sufficiently convinced of the existence of such 
advantages before sanctioning the use of Islamic 
finance. The regulation and supervision of Islamic 
finance is more involved than that of its counterpart. 
Regulators must watch out for certain peculiarities in 
order to make their regulation of Islamic finance 
effective. 
Using a mixed banking system, where both Islamic and 
conventional finance are allowed to freely compete is 
one solution, however, the paper points out few hurdles 
that must be surmounted. 
Finally, the paper lists some policy recommendations 
for the monetary authorities and financial regulators in 
order to make the most benefit from the use of Islamic 
finance. 
The first section of the paper details what we can learn 
from monetary, banking and finance theories with 
regard to Islamic finance. The second section attempts 
to list the advantages of Islamic finance, based on these 
theories. The third section discusses the problems 
associated with a mixed banking and finance system 
and how they can be surmounted. The last section 
draws policy recommendations.  
The paper builds on the authors earlier contributions 
on the subject, particularly, Al-Jarhi 1981 and 2004.  
  
 
 
WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM ECONOMIC THEORY 
I. THE RATE OF INTEREST 
Islamic finance starts from one basic concept that is to avoid 
trading directly present for future money.  Finance is 
provided in the form of money in return for either equity or 
rights to share proportionately in future business profits.  It 
is also provided in the form of commodities delivered in 
return for commitment to repay their value at a future date.  
It is further provided against a commitment to deliver or 
manufacture commodities.   
Can we find anything in economics that justify 
apprehensions about trading present against future money 
at a premium, which is the rate of interest? 
Until the middle of the twentieth century, it seemed to 
everyone that no wrong could be found with the system.  
However, in search for optimal monetary policies, 
economists stumbled on the relationship between the level 
of the rate of interest and the optimality of resource 
allocation.  Monetary economists found that a zero nominal 
interest rate is a necessary condition for the optimal 
allocation of resources (Friedman, 1969)1.   
The reason is simple.  In a world of fiat money, adding one 
marginal unit of real balances costs no real resources to the 
community.  Therefore, imposing a positive price on the use 
of money would lead traders to economize on the use of 
money in transactions, in their pursuit to minimize their 
                             
1  Paul Samuelson (1958) reached a similar conclusion earlier than Friedman, using a 
consumption-loan model. 
transactions costs2. However, when the rate of interest is 
zero, traders will have no incentive to substitute real 
resources for money.  Additional real resources can therefore 
be directed to consumption and investment.   
It has also been found in general equilibrium models that a 
zero interest rate is both necessary and sufficient for 
allocative efficiency (Cole and Kocherlakota, 1998; Wilson, 
1979).  These theoretical results are dependent on some 
simplifying assumptions. Yet, they are robust in a variety of 
models (Correia and Teles, 1997).   
In Milton Friedman’s words, “Our final rule for the optimum 
quantity of money is that it will be attained by a rate of price 
deflation that makes the rate of interest equal to zero.” 3  
Friedman goes further to suggest steadily contracting the 
money supply at a rate equal to the representative 
household time preference (Friedman, 1969, p. 34 quoted by 
Ireland, 2000). 
Such policy rule clearly implies that the optimal rate of 
inflation is negative.  However, Central bankers would never 
seriously advocate a long-run policy of deflation (Wolman, 
1997). 
One problem with such policy is the existence of a liquidity 
trap when the rate of interest is zero (Uhlig, 2000).  Several 
economists point out that deflationary policies have to be 
exercised only asymptotically in order to apply the 
Friedman’s Rule (Cole and Kocherlakota, 1998).  Even if the 
                             
2 If a supermarket were faced with an increase in interest rates, it would attempt to collect cash 
faster from its tellers and rush it more often to the bank, using more labor (people who collect 
cash as well as security guards) and capital (armored cars). Obviously, the withdrawal of real 
resources from production into transactions reduces total output and efficiency (Al-Jarhi, 2016. 
3 We have brought this quotation in order to show that what is intended is not to impose a zero 
rate of interest on the national economy, but to reach the desired level through the process of 
deflation.  
asymptotic conditions are not fulfilled, short-term 
constraints on monetary policy can do the job (Ireland, 
2000).  Another problem is that when the rate of interest 
becomes very low, monetary authorities have less leeway 
with adjusting it downwards in the face of recession.  Some 
economists propose alternative ways to overcome the zero-
bound interest rates (Goodfriend, 2000), but such problem 
appeared to be tougher than previously thought few years 
after the onset of the International Financial Crisis of 2007-
2012.  Another problem is that deflation has efficiency 
problems parallel to those of inflation, even at very low 
interest rates (Lucas, 1994).  However, the welfare cost of 
implementing a zero rate of interest are claimed to be 
negligible (Wolman, 1997).   
Many economists appear convinced that practical and 
conceptual problems involved with zero interest rates are all 
surmountable.  Nonetheless, monetary authorities are not 
yet impressed.  No monetary authority has so far come 
forward to adopt the optimal monetary policy rule4.  
II. RISK-SHARING AND MARKET STRUCTURE 
Risk sharing is a basic feature of the Islamic economic 
system. In the financial sector, households provide their 
funds to financial intermediaries on a profit-and-loss-
sharing, PLS, basis. Financial intermediaries supply funds 
to their users partly on PLS and partly on sale-finance basis. 
Islamic finance is sometimes likened to a participatory sport 
in contrast to conventional finance, which is likened to 
spectators’ sport (Al-Jarhi, 2004). 
                             
4 Economists also recommended the application of 100 percent required reserve ratio.  However, 
policy-makers have not been impressed, despite the obvious benefits. 
It would be an interesting proposition to test whether the 
relative predominance of risk sharing in an economy 
increases its efficiency. Despite difficulties, Kalemli-Ozcan et 
al., 1999) have developed an interesting scheme to fulfill the 
same purpose. 
They find a positive and significant relation between the 
degree of specialization of individual members of a group of 
countries, provinces, states, or prefectures, and the amount 
of risk that is shared within the group. Their regressions 
confirm that risk sharing facilitated by a favorable legal 
environment and a developed financial system is a direct 
causal determinant of industrial specialization. 
Risk sharing therefore furthers specialization, thereby 
raising the efficiency of the economy as a whole. In Islamic 
economic systems, risk sharing goes beyond the mere 
integration of capital market. It should be more prevalent 
through the financial market structure, producing more 
specialization and greater overall efficiency. 
The conventional finance sector is almost void of risk 
sharing. On the resource mobilization side, fund owners 
provide their financial resources on the basis of the classical 
lending contract. Accordingly, banks taking deposits would 
guarantee both principle and interest on their customers’ 
deposits. On the resource use side, conventional banks 
provide finance on the same basis. Banks would not enter 
into risk-sharing arrangements with entrepreneurs. Instead, 
they take risk only on collateral and not on entrepreneurial 
activities. Generally, banks do limited monitoring of their 
borrowers, in order to minimize default risks. 
Similarly, in the bond market, bond issuers guarantee the 
payment of principal and interest, while bondholders do not 
share in the business risk of bond issuers. Bondholders 
meanwhile do not monitor bond issuers. Trading bonds in 
an open market provides information that can be collected 
and analyzed by bondholders. Monitoring the market of a 
certain bond appears to be less expensive than monitoring 
borrowers by banks. That is probably why bondholders are 
willing to accept lower interest rates than do banks. 
Consequently, Corporate bonds as a share of total credit 
market instruments averaged about 58 percent between in 
2013, compared to 10 percent to bank loans the US 
(Contessi et al, 2013). 
We can therefore conclude that most of financing in 
conventional economies is conducted in the unmonitored 
section of the financial sector, namely the bond market. 
However, banks still provide some resources.  
Corporate bonds Risk sharing is found only in the stock 
market, where shareholders presumably share in the profit 
and loss of the firms whose stock they hold. 
III. BANKING AND FINANCE THEORIES, INFORMATION 
ASYMMETRY & THE LEMON PROBLEM   
According to banking theory, those who obtain debt finance 
(finance users) are better informed about the use of funds 
they obtain than finance providers. Therefore, debt finance 
can be riddled by information asymmetry leading to default. 
In parallel, equity finance provider can be exposed to 
investing in a losing venture. Equity finance therefore may 
be riddled by losses. 
In such a world, an entrepreneur who is more informed than 
the supplier of fund would use internally available funds to 
invest in the firm. He would also prefer to use debt finance 
when more funds are required (Razin et al, 1998). The reason 
is that using equity finance would be interpreted as a belief 
that the stocks of the firm are overvalued. It remains to show 
how investors handle the lemon problem or the risk of loss 
in the case of equity finance, and how the fund provider 
handles the problem of information asymmetry. 
Usually information asymmetry in debt finance is reduced 
through monitoring. However, complete monitoring of fund 
users would be extremely costly. In order to do any 
significant amount of monitoring, banks will have to raise 
the lending rates of interest to cover the extra monitoring 
costs. Handling the lemon problem is much easier through 
the conduct and review of feasibility studies. 
Since debt and equity finance has its own problem, the 
former has the information asymmetry problem and the 
latter the lemon problem, the relative use of each will depend 
on the relative ease each of the two corresponding problems 
can be attenuated. 
The lemon problem of equity finance can be handled by two 
tools. The first is feasibility studies for new projects or 
financial analysis for existing firms. The second is 
governance. This particular tool has been used by universal 
banks5 as they take equity in companies to influence their 
governance and insure their profitability. Information 
asymmetry can be handled through extensive monitoring, 
which could be rather costly. An innovative and less 
expensive approach has been used by universal banks, 
which is to take equity in a company and provide it with debt 
                             
5 Universal banks are defined as “large-scale banks that operate extensive networks of branches, 
provide many different services, hold several claims on firms (including equity and debt), and 
participate directly in the corporate governance of the firms that rely on the banks as sources of 
funding or as securities underwriters, “(Calomiris, 2000). 
finance. In this manner, universal banks solve the lemon 
and information asymmetry problems simultaneously.  
We can now turn to some issues that have been raised with 
regard to universal banking. The starting point is that 
universal banking eliminates information asymmetry and 
the associated risks of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Adverse selection can be avoided by careful screening of 
finance applicants.  When a bank provides equity and debt 
finance simultaneously, it will have more access to 
information than when only debt finance is provided.  We 
can therefore conclude that screening would be more 
effective and adverse selection less probable with universal 
banking. 
Reducing the possibilities of moral hazard requires 
monitoring the firm that obtains finance.  All three kinds of 
ex ante, interim and ex post monitoring must be exercised 
to be effective (Aoki, 2013).  Equity finance provides the bank 
with access to information necessary to practice monitoring 
at all intervals.  That explains why the research of Dewenter 
and Hess (1997) supports the idea that relationship 
(universal) banks are more effective monitors than 
transactional (commercial) banks.  
Equity finance also reduces the firm incentives to substitute 
riskier for safer assets.  Meanwhile, debt finance would 
reduce the firm incentives to hide its profits.  Furthermore, 
when the firm faces problems, the bank, as an equity holder, 
will assist in order to protect its investment.  
In summary, banking theory indicates that universal 
banking would be exposed to lower levels of moral hazard 
and adverse selection.  In addition, by sitting on the firms’ 
board of directors, banks could influence corporate 
governance in the whole productive sector, leading to 
improvements in economic performance.  
Empirically, it has been found that using a combination of 
debt and equity finance by banks seems to carry several 
advantages to both banks and firms, confirming theoretical 
findings.  Banking theory would indicate that banks would 
be relatively more exposed to adverse selection during 
economic upturns and to moral hazard during downturns.  
Applied research has found that universal banks face lower 
risk than commercial banks during both upturns and 
downturns.  In addition, the risk differential between 
universal and commercial banks gets wider and more 
significant during downturns (Dewenter and Hess, 1997)6.  
PRICE AND MONETARY THEORY 
Another contribution in price and monetary theories is the 
distinction between nominal, real and semi real transactions 
(Al-Jarhi, 2002). Nominal transactions have two nominal 
(monetary) countervalues. One example of a nominal 
transaction is when spot money is traded against future 
money. Another example is when the price of a gamble is 
paid as present money against the payoff of the gamble 
which is usually paid in the future, as in the case of 
derivatives. When both countervalues are deferred, market 
authorities set safeguards to insure that both parties to the 
gamble will pay their obligations. Whether nominal 
transactions are carried out in an organized financial market 
or in a gambling casino, their ultimate results are 
distributional between gambling parties.  
                             
6 For an exposition of the main issues regarding universal banking, see Appendix II 
The macroeconomic effects of nominal transactions take two 
forms. In the first form, the growth in the volume of nominal 
transactions will encourage investments in the gambling 
industries and associated services. In the financial markets, 
more investment would also be directed to accounting, 
clearing mechanisms, strategic trading mechanisms and 
enforcement mechanisms usually associated with this type 
of transactions.   
The redistribution of wealth would have effects on the 
consumption pattern in the economy and motivate 
reallocation of resources that caters to the tastes and 
preferences of the social group that gains wealth against the 
rest of the society. 
The important result is that trading present for future money 
is always done through nominal transactions. Whether a 
debt instrument or a risk associated with some gamble is 
traded in the financial market, the related transaction has 
two nominal countervalues, one on each side.  
Real transactions have only one nominal or monetary 
countervalue, while the other is always a commodity. Such 
transactions provide important indicators for the allocation 
of resources. When the rate of monetary expansion 
increases, more money is available for spending either 
directly or through the increase in the availability of finance. 
Spending would increase on commodities as well as on debt 
and risk trading. 
An increase in spending on commodities is done through 
real transactions, which become the chariot of the 
transmission mechanism from the changes in money supply 
to commodity markets directly. The more spending increases 
go through real commodities; the faster commodity markets 
would move to a new equilibrium. However, the more 
spending is directed to debt and risk trading, the greater the 
leakages as spending on commodities would await the 
conduct of financial market games and the resulting payoffs. 
Those gaining wealth would, after some delay, increase their 
commodity purchases by carrying out more real 
transactions. Such delay and leakages to nominal 
transactions slows the speeds of adjustments in commodity 
markets.   
Therefore, the effect of policy actions leading to an increase 
in monetary expansion on commodity markets would 
depend on how much of the increase in the money supply 
goes into nominal versus real transactions. 
Semi real transactions can be defined as the exchange of one 
currency for another currency, where both countervalues 
are paid spot. Trading currencies against each, where one or 
both of the countervalues is deferred, would be considered a 
nominal transaction. Spot trading of currencies would be for 
the purpose of paying for commodities across the borders. 
They, therefore, have the same effects of real transactions. 
Meanwhile, currency trading with deferred payments would 
be for the purpose of debt or risk trading. 
A CONCISE ISLAMIC FINANCE MODEL 
I. GENERAL FEATURES 
The prohibition of Reba entails an institutional structure 
that remains based on market mechanism, but has features 
that replace interest-based finance with interest-free 
finance. The institutional structure should be sufficiently 
comprehensive to encompass money creation and allocation, 
as well as monetary and fiscal policies (Al-Jarhi, 1981) 
A. ISSUING AND ALLOCATION OF MONEY 
Drawing from Al-Jarhi, 1981, the Islamic monetary system 
will have a central bank and member banks. Money is issued 
in the form of central bank investment deposits, CD’s with 
banks, placed on the basis of profit and loss sharing, PLS7. 
the return on CD’s will flow back to the central bank as 
seigniorage for the ultimate benefit of government budget. 
In order to fulfill the Islamic economic rule that wealth 
redistribution must be justifiable, and to provide the central 
bank with full and direct control over the money supply, and 
to avoid the use of monetary policy tools that would lead to 
drastic changes in the money supply, the fractional reserve 
system is replaced with total reserves. 
The central bank issues money-market instruments whose 
proceeds would be added to the central deposits, which we 
will call central deposit certificates or CDC's. Such 
instrument would be negotiable in secondary market and 
available to banks and the public for investment. 
Like the central bank, the public places their fund in 
investment accounts, based on PLS. the public can also hold 
CDC's. in addition, they can place demand deposits with 
banks which are used for transactions services and earn no 
return. On the fund-use side, people can finance their 
activities, based on one of sixteen contracts, which are listed 
in Appendix I.  
                             
7 All 16 Islamic modes of finance are listed and annotated in the appendix. 
What happens to government budget deficit? First, the 
government finances its income generating activities 
through banks. Even infrastructure projects can be made 
income generating in order to attract finance on market 
terms. Second, citizens could be encouraged to establish 
Awqaf, or public foundations to provide public services, 
especially education and health8.  To the extent such Awqaf 
are encouraged, the government will limit its activities in this 
regard to setting standards for education and health 
services.  
Redistribution in favor of the poor is done outside the market 
mechanism, through the collection of Zakah, for which 
banks become custodians as well as authorized to use the 
proceeds to finance micro projects whose titles are 
transferred to the poor in order to make them self-employed 
and self-sufficient as well.  
There will be no integrated debt market, nor risk trading 
would be allowed. The central bank, having an exclusive 
power to control the money supply, can gauge the rate of 
monetary expansion to the rate of growth in order to target 
absolute price stability. 
EFFICIENCY OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
                             
8 Private foundations are considered to be perpetual after-life charity, that earn rewards from 
God while their founders are dead. That is why Muslems have been keen to establish them. In 
the past, most of health and education services were provided through private foundations. 
I. MACROECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
A. EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIZING ON CASH IN 
TRANSITIONS 
At the macroeconomic level, Islamic finance avoids the use 
of interest-based lending.  The rate of interest is replaced by 
the rate of profit on partnership and PLS finance, markups 
on credit-purchase finance and rental rates on leasing 
finance9.  They reflect the time-value of money not against 
itself, but against commodities. 
The main purpose of the Friedman optimal monetary policy 
rule (to deflate the economy at a rate equal to the real rate 
of interest), is to prevent agents from substituting real 
resources for money in transactions, as this would reduce 
total output below the optimum level. Those who deposit 
their money in banks do so in the form of saving and 
investment accounts which are based on PLS. in this case, 
the rate of return would be uncertain. Neither the principal 
nor the return on such accounts or deposits is guaranteed. 
There would be no incentive to reduce the use of cash in 
transactions in order to gain more income with certainty, as 
in the case of the classical loan contract.  
B. EFFICIENCY & FINANCIAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Conventional finance allocates financial resources with 
paramount regard for borrower’s ability to repay loans, both 
principal and interest.  In the modes of Islamic finance that 
are based on equity and PLS, focus would be on the 
profitability and rate of return of the concerned investment.  
This type of finance has the potential of directing financial 
                             
9 Such rates of return must be somehow related. They are all market determined and should not 
be subject to price-setting by policymakers. 
resources to the most productive investments. It would 
increase the efficiency of the financing process and reinforce 
efficiency in the real sectors. 
Modes of Islamic finance that are based on commodity 
acquisition, used in an open market with sufficient 
competition among fund users, the cost of finance10, will 
depend, at the margin, on the relative value in use of each 
commodity, whether in consumption or production.  
Resource allocation would again be optimal. No finance 
would be provided for debt or risk trading.      
STABILITY 
A conventional bank has on the one hand liabilities that 
include demand, time and saving deposits, which the bank 
guarantees.  On the other hand, it has assets that are mostly 
composed of debt instruments each of which has quality that 
depends on the ability of the corresponding debtor to repay.  
Default on the asset side, if it happens in significant 
proportion, would imply the inability to meet the bank’s 
obligations on the liability side. Such default can be expected 
at times of crises, be it of macroeconomic nature or caused 
by circumstances specific to the bank. 
A bank operating according to Islamic rules of finance has 
liabilities of different nature.  Only demand deposits are 
guaranteed.  Meanwhile, saving and investment deposits are 
placed on PLS basis.  When a bank faces macroeconomic or 
bank-specific crises, investment depositors automatically 
share investment and default risk on the asset side.  The 
bank is less likely to fall and a bank run is less probable.  It 
                             
10 Markup rates and rental rates. 
can therefore be said that an Islamic banking system is 
relatively more stable when compared to conventional 
banking (Khan, 1986). 
In conventional finance, there is an integrated debt market 
that has grown immense in size as well as in scale of 
integration.  Many experiences, as lately manifested in the 
International Financial Crisis (2008-2012), have shown that 
integrated debt markets are sources of both domestic 
financial instability and contagion.  Some economists have 
come forward with proposals to place restrictions on capital 
movements in contrary with what has been considered in 
economics as received doctrine.   
In contrast, debt is created in Islamic finance through selling 
commodities on credit.  Resulting debt instruments are 
negotiable only at face value.  There is a credit market for 
each commodity in which the demand and supply to buy it 
on credit determines a mark-up rate11 for it, resulting in fully 
segmented credit markets12.  The absence of sudden and 
mass movements of funds as well as risk trading, rules out 
instability and contagion. 
We have noted above that Islamic finance never provides 
present money in return for future money.  All Islamic modes 
of finance involve money on the one end and commodities on 
the other13.  Monetary flows through Islamic financial modes 
are directly tied up with commodity flows.  In other words, 
                             
11  The mark-up rate is the difference between the spot price and the deferred price as a 
percentage of the spot price. 
12 At maturity both countervalues, viz., debt and its nominal value would be spot and equal in 
amount, thereby fulfilling the necessary conditions for trading money in Islam.  Meanwhile, debt 
can be swapped against tangible goods or services (according to Imam Malik and Ibn Taymiah, 
but not for cash. 
13This meaning includes all sale finance. Partnership and investment agency finance can be 
considered as money advanced for shares in future income resulting from commodity-related 
activities. 
Islamic finance removes the dichotomy between financial 
and real activities.  This leaves no room for excessive credit 
expansion, as each finance extended is automatically 
earmarked for specific uses. 
Changes in supply of money by policymakers would 
automatically be translated into changes in excess demands 
and supplies of commodities, causing quantities of output 
produced to respond more quickly to market forces.  In other 
words, markets are more likely to operate efficiently and 
smoothly.  It is therefore interesting to note that Islamic 
finance, though non-conventional, supports market forces 
and mechanisms more than does conventional finance.   
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
Assuming no regulatory hindrances, Islamic banks, like 
universal banks, can carry out both investment and 
commercial banking activities. Islamic banks would 
therefore be allowed to provide finance through a 
combination of modes, enabling them to mix contracts that 
are free from information asymmetry with others suffering 
from it. Islamic banks, like universal banks can therefore 
hold equity in the banks they finance.  In this respect, they 
bear resemblance to universal banks and can be thought to 
handle the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection 
better than conventional (commercial) banks (Al-Jarhi. 
2003).   
FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
A. OPERATING AS UNIVERSAL BANKS 
Some economists believe that the universal banking that 
combines all phases of finance can be credited in part for 
industrial development and economic growth in Germany 
and Japan.  Universal banking is thought to have yielded 
economies of scope and greater efficiency that provided more 
finance at lower costs, thereby promoting industrial 
investment 14 . In particular, German banks have been 
perceived to maintain close, long-term relationships with 
industrial firms, which influenced banks attitudes towards 
multi-period optimization (Fohlin, 1998).  This opinion is 
supported by Terrin (1998), but opposed by Fohlin (1998) as 
well as Miwa and Ramseyer (2000). 
The ability to act like universal banking by Islamic banks 
put their financing activities right in the center of the 
development process.  Bankers in this case become both 
partners and financiers of entrepreneurial efforts to develop 
the economy.   
Empirical findings seem to confirm this about universal 
banks. Calomiris (2000), through his study of pre-World-
War I Germany, has found that universal banking served to 
reduce the cost of financing industrialization in Germany 
relative to its corresponding level in other countries where 
commercial banking is prevalent.  He also found that the 
financial sector reached a higher level of allocative efficiency 
in the former than in the latter.  We can therefore rest 
assured that Islamic banks operating as universal banks 
give better support to development efforts. 
                             
14 For a theoretical analysis of the relationship between finance and growth, see, e. g,, 22.
 Nyankomo (2015), Greenwood and Smith (1997) and Vaona (2005). 
B. FUND MOBILIZATION   
Many followers of religions that abhor interest (Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam) hold their 
funds outside the banking and financial sector, thereby 
placing their financial resources outside the development 
process.  Islamic finance opens the door to mobilizing such 
resources, especially in many Islamic countries where they 
would be otherwise kept idle.  Islamic financial products 
would be both interest-free and ethical15. This makes Islamic 
finance even the more effective in resource mobilization to 
the groups of people interested in both: the avoidance of 
interest and the involvement in ethical investment.  
ADJUSTMENTS TO POLICY SHOCKS 
By going deeper into understanding the prohibition of 
interest, we find that it is really the prohibition of trading 
present against future money at a premium. One would 
discover that the prohibition of interest amounts exactly to 
the prohibition of nominal transactions (Al-Jarhi, 2016).  
We can therefore interpret the prohibition of Reba from the 
economic perspective as the prohibition of trading present 
nominal (monetary) values against future nominal 
(monetary) values. This is equivalent to the prohibition of all 
nominal transactions, which would encompass both debt 
and risk trading. 
                             
15  One cannot help but notice that the word “Islamic” in this context could have two 
meanings.  The first refers to the quality of the financial product, viz., that it satisfies the 
Islamic requirements for lawful contracts.  The second is that it satisfies ethical standards 
as defined by religion.  In this sense, Islamic finance is equally Christian, Jewish, Buddhist 
and Hindu. 
In an economy with Islamic finance, when the supply of 
money increases, spending increases both directly and 
through more financing. In Islamic finance, both spending 
and finance is channeled exclusively through real 
transactions. Direct spending means direct cash flows to the 
commodity sector. Financing would also boost both supply 
and demand. The quantity and price speeds of adjustment 
get full throttle, as no cash balances leak to nominal 
transactions. The transmission mechanism from monetary 
expansion to spending is direct. In such an economy the 
speeds of adjustments are swift, and the market mechanism 
is fully supported. 
In contrast, monetary expansion in a system with 
conventional finance transmits more slowly into the real 
sector. On the one hand, substantial leakage from monetary 
expansion flows into nominal transactions, viz, debt and risk 
trading. The final effects on the commodity sector will not 
emerge until the payoff of gambling games in the financial 
market reach the pockets of winners.  In addition, the first 
effect of the financing directed to commodity sectors would 
go to the demand side first. Price speeds of adjustment 
would be higher while quantity speeds of adjustments would 
lag behind. Inflation would be the ultimate result, even when 
the economy is below full employment. 
Ultimately, with conventional finance, we have slower 
speeds of adjustment, biased towards price adjustments. 
The market mechanism would limb slowly to the new 
equilibrium, if ever reached. 
We can conclude that by prohibiting nominal transactions, 
Islamic finance boosts speeds of adjustment, as they would 
also be balanced between quantity and price speeds. The 
market mechanism is ultimately strengthened. 
SYSTEMIC INTEGRITY 
Risk is an important ingredient of making investment.  In 
conventional finance, investment is financed through equity 
(stock market) or through debt (borrowing from banks and 
issuing bonds). Banks accept only collateral risk. They 
always avoid bearing the risks of investment failure. 
Corporate bondholders follow the same rule and their debt 
carries seniority over shareholders’ rights. The result is that 
risk is left to be borne by few specialists, who are either 
entrepreneurs or shareholders. Such minority of risk 
bearers shoulder the brunt of investment failure. Although 
the per capita risk for the whole society may be low, risk 
concentration on a small group could be unbearable. The 
commodity sector would be far removed from the finance 
sector, as each goes its own way. In other words, the system 
would be disjoint.  
In Islamic finance, banks and financial institutions 
advancing funds share risk with those receiving finance, 
including producers, traders, and the like.  Islamic finance 
with proper corporate governance would allow depositors 
some influence on banks investment decisions so that they 
can share in the decision-making process, by sitting on the 
boards of directors of firms receiving funds. This change that 
we have proposed would extend risk as well as decision 
sharing to both the asset and liability sides of banks (Al-
Jarhi, 2014).  
We can therefore notice that risk as well as decision-making 
is spread over a much larger number and wider variety of 
concerned people. This allows for wider involvement in 
economic activities, so that people will eventually feel they 
are partners rather than spectators.  
The benefit of wider involvement goes beyond the mere 
feeling.  It adds to the stability of banks.  The finance sector 
would be closely tied to the commodity sector. This affords 
the economic system compactness and integrity between its 
different parts. 
EQUITY 
Islamic banks and financial institutions, by themselves, 
cannot reduce, let alone, eradicate poverty.  However, if 
given the right tools, they can contribute to the efforts taken 
by the whole society in that regard.   
Islam prescribes a tax-subsidy approach to reducing 
poverty.  A levy called Zakah is paid out by those whose 
wealth exceeds a certain minimum level in proportion to 
their property or income. 
Zakah proceeds are to be earmarked for several uses 
including income and wealth maintenance for the poor.  
Income maintenance is provided provisionally to the poor 
until wealth maintenance is restored.  Zakah proceeds would 
be earmarked to finance micro projects whose titles are given 
to the poor.  This method of poverty reduction can be closely 
intertwined with that of economic development, as 
redistribution is mostly directed towards making the poor 
more productive, which in turn contributes to economic 
development.   
Islamic banks can help by acting as custodians of Zakah 
proceeds and in their disbursement.  Islamic banks are also 
mandated to have special accounts for the Zakah due on 
their shareholders’ equity.  They can even accept direct 
payments of Zakah and other donations on behalf of 
depositors and other donors. Banks can then use funds 
available in their Zakah accounts for the purposes of income 
and wealth maintenance of the poor.   
Conventional lending gives utmost attention to the ability to 
repay loans.  To ascertain such ability, it depends 
overwhelmingly on the provisions of collaterals and 
guarantees.  Thus, those already rich would have most 
access to finance.  In contrast, Islamic finance providing 
funds on equity or profit-sharing basis would be more 
concerned about profitability and rate of return and less 
concerned about collateral as the primary consideration.  
Those who are not wealthy, but have worthy investment 
projects, would have more access to finance.     
DEBT SUSTAINABILITY 
Conventional debt has certain characteristics that could 
place debtors in difficulties if circumstances do not allow 
them to repay in time.  Interest is usually calculated on the 
outstanding balance of debt, usually compounded annually 
and sometimes at shorter intervals.  Delinquent debtors are 
often subjected to penalty rates of interest, which are higher 
than regular rates.  It is not uncommon to find borrowers 
who end up paying debt service that is many folds the 
original principal they borrowed.  This is particularly 
symptomatic credit-card and developing-countries debt, as 
they continue to face debt problems that sometimes reach 
crisis levels.  Debtors frequently seek debt relief through 
bankruptcy procedures. Developing countries appeal their 
cases with creditors clubs in London and Paris.    
Conventional debt generally lacks sustainability that has 
been demonstrated at times of crises, when attention is 
usually directed to bailout lenders (banks) and not 
borrowers. 
Debt created through Islamic finance has characteristics 
that makes it sustainable.  Particularly, the total value of 
debt, which includes the spot value of commodities 
purchased on credit as well as an implicit mark-up, is set 
from the very beginning16. 
When debtors face unavoidable circumstances that would 
make them temporarily insolvent, Shari'ah rules mandate 
that they are granted free rescheduling and grace periods to 
help them bring their finances back to order.  No penalty fees 
can be levied in this case. 
Due to the information asymmetry associated with 
conventional finance, moral hazard leads to using borrowed 
funds for non-prescribed purposes, leading to default. In 
contrast, the absence of information asymmetry and moral 
hazard from Islamic finance mandates that the advanced 
funds are used for their prescribed purpose.  Default 
resulting from improper use of funds would therefore be 
most unlikely. 
REFORM AGENDA FOR CONVENTIONAL FINANCE 
Conventional finance has shown exposure to instability and 
contagion. The latest International Financial Crisis of 2008 
was accompanied by widespread bank failure confronted by 
expensive bank bailout, in addition to a serious recession 
that lingered for four years after the onset of the crisis. Some 
                             
16 During the International Financial Crisis, had the authorities directed their attention to 
support debtors instead of creditors, the crises would have stopped without an ensuing serious 
depression. 
economists advanced reform proposals revolving around 
tighter regulation. Others suggested that capital movements 
should be curtailed. An interesting opinion goes back to the 
Chicago plan submitted during the Great Depression. 
Given the above analysis regarding Islamic finance, we can 
perceive that it contains a prescription to the problems of 
contemporary market economies in the following 
institutional changes. 
1. Replacing the classical loan contract by the 16 Islamic 
finance contract, 
2. Exclusive monopoly of the issuing of money through a 
government-owned central bank, 
3. All issued money is to be placed in PLS investment 
accounts with banks, 
4. The central bank issues central investment certificates, to 
be held by banks and the public and traded in an open 
market as an interbank and monetary policy instrument, 
5. Debt trading as well as the use of all risk-trading contracts 
is prohibited in financial markets, 
6. Debtors would be granted free rescheduling in case of 
temporary illiquidity, but penalized in case of delinquency. 
This prescription has been taken directly from the features 
that make Islamic finance enjoy stability and less prone to 
crises.  
MIXED SYSTEMS HURDLES 
The eight advantages of Islamic finance appear to be 
externalities that accrue to the system as a whole, but do 
not accrue directly to any Islamic bank or financial 
institution in particular. This creates an incentive problem; 
Islamic bankers would not be sufficiently motivated to follow 
the Islamic finance paradigm to the letter. The incentive 
problem can be solved through some method of internalizing 
the external benefits.  
In mixed systems with the absence of any means of 
internalization, Islamic bankers have to compete with 
conventional bankers who use the classical loan contract, 
which is simpler, requiring fewer procedures and less 
documentation than the 16 Islamic modes of finance. Strict 
following of the Islamic finance paradigm would lead a 
serious competitive loss to IBFI.   
In order to maintain their competitive position, they either 
switch to outright conventional finance, or maintain their 
nominal brand name and mimic conventional finance. This 
enables them to streamline procedures, documentation and 
cut down costs.  
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
We have demonstrated by using macroeconomic, banking 
price and finance theories that Islamic finance, when applied 
according to our paradigm (Al-Jarhi, 1981) would have 
distinct advantages. In addition, it provides a justifiable 
prescription for reforming the contemporary market 
economy. 
The advantages of Islamic finance formulated above, 
although noteworthy, are not sufficient to induce Islamic 
bankers to be true to Islamic finance. The reason is that 
such advantages are mostly external and can only induce 
behavior after being internalized. An important policy 
implication is that such internalization is left to banking and 
finance regulators. Only when the license of Islamic banking 
is strictly enforced by the monetary regulators that Islamic 
bankers would stop mimicking conventional finance. 
Our main policy implications are only one headline that 
requires more detailed explanation which could be found 
somewhere else (Al-Jarhi, 2014). In addition, some Islamic 
finance contracts require special guidelines in order to 
reduce the amount of information asymmetry associated 
with them. In particular, certain modifications have to be 
introduced to the corporate governance of Islamic banks, 
especially in allowing investment account holders to be 
represented on their boards of directors. 
  
APPENDIX I: MAJOR CONTRACTS AND PRODUCTS 
OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
I. INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL CONTRACTS 
The following is a list of Islamic investment and finance 
contracts briefly described. 
A. COMPREHENSIVE PARTNERSHIP 
1. Musharaka (partnership in profit, loss and management) 
1.1. Equity finance, entails; 
1.1.1. profit and loss sharing, 
1.1.2. sharing in management, 
1.2. free from information asymmetry, 
1.3. profit distributed in agreed proportion, 
1.4. loss is distributed in proportion to capital 
subscription, 
2. Musharaka Mutanaqessa (diminishing partnership in 
profit, loss and management) 
2.1. Same as Musharaka, except it is done for a specific 
period and extinguished gradually every year.  
B. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
1. Mudaraba (limited partnership) 
1.1. Entails sharing in profit and loss but not in 
management. 
1.2. Limited time horizon, after which it is liquidated, 
1.3. Suffers from information asymmetry. 
1.4. The investment agent (Mudareb) presents a 
feasibility study regarding the proposed investments, 
with an estimate of the indicative rate of return. 
1.5. Requires “limited partnership guidelines” that 
enforces the Mudareb (investment agent) to  
1.5.1. Present a feasibility study, estimating 
expecting returns, 
1.5.2. Hold regular bookkeeping, 
1.5.3. Present regular reports 
1.5.4. Channel all inflows and outflows through an 
account jointly controlled by the bank and the 
investment agent, 
1.5.5. Guidelines must be applied to place the 
burden of proof on the shoulders of the investment 
agent (Mudareb) in cases of negligence and breach 
of contract, and in particular, when the rate of 
return falls below the indicative rate. 
2. Restricted Mudaraba (partnership)  
2.1. Limited equity investment 
2.2. Based on profit and loss sharing 
2.3. The investment agent is bound by explicit 
restrictions that could be related, among other things, 
to investment formulas, sectors and geography, 
2.4. It is subject to information asymmetry. However, 
guidelines may reduce the extent of the risks involved.   
2.5. Require limited partnership guidelines, 
3. Mudaraba Mutanaqessa (diminishing partnership in 
profit and loss) 
3.1. Limited equity investment 
3.2. Based on profit and loss sharing 
3.3. The investment period is set from the very 
beginning. 
3.4. The total value of finance is extinguished gradually 
every year by transferring title from financier to 
investment agent. 
4. Unrestricted Investment Wakala (unrestricted 
investment agency) 
4.1. The investment expert submits a feasibility study 
regarding proposed investment activities, with an 
estimate of indicative returns. 
4.2. A contract is signed by a fund owner and an 
investment expert. 
4.3. The investment agent gets a fixed fee for investment 
services. He/she can be offered a percentage of the 
profits over and above a certain hurdle rate as an 
incentive. 
4.4. This contract is exposed to information asymmetry. 
4.5. Guidelines must be applied to place the burden of 
proof on the shoulders of the investment agent in cases 
of negligence and breach of contract, and in particular, 
when the rate of return falls below the indicative rate. 
5. Restricted Investment Wakala (restricted investment 
agency) 
C. PARTNERSHIP IN PRODUCT 
1. Muzara'a (A joint agricultural venture, based on 
partnership in agricultural produce) 
1.1. It is a form of partnership that is free from 
information asymmetry. 
1.2. One partner is a proprietor and the other is a 
farmer,  
1.3. The proprietor provides a piece of arable land and 
the farmer provides farming labor.  
1.4. Working capital (seeds, fertilizers, etc.) can be 
provided by either party or both in agreed proportions.  
1.5. Product is also shared in agreed proportion. 
2. Mugharassa (partnership in jointly managed plantation 
fruit or lumber) 
2.1. One party is a proprietary who provides land. 
2.2. Another party is an expert in horticulture, who 
plants the land with fruit and/or lumber trees. 
2.3. Inputs are shared between the two or provided by 
one party, as agreed. 
2.4. The planted land is divided between the original 
owner and the horticulture expert in agreed 
proportions.  
3. Mussaqah (partnership in fruit and lumber in return for 
managing a plantation) 
3.1. One party is a proprietor that owns a plantation. 
3.2. Another party is an expert in horticulture. 
3.3. The second party takes care of the trees until they 
bear fruit, through pruning, fertilizing, etc. 
3.4. The fruit harvest is divided as agreed. 
D. SALE FINANCE 
1. Bai' Bethaman Ajel (deferred payment sale) 
1.1. It is a sale contract,  
1.2. The delivery of commodities is done spot. 
1.3. Payment of price is deferred. 
1.4. The deferred price is higher than the spot price to 
reflect time preference in the sold commodity. 
2. Murabaha (cost plus markup sale upon promise to 
purchase) 
2.1. Sale contract on cost plus markup. 
2.2. The buyer signs a unilateral binding promise to 
purchase commodities stating the markup and 
payment terms. 
2.3. The buyer usually pays a deposit or down payment 
as proof of seriousness. 
2.4. Retracting the promise makes the buyer liable for 
actual damage, which is equal to the difference between 
the purchase cost to the bank and the sale price to a 
third party. 
2.5. Not subject to information asymmetry. 
2.6. Can be used as a camouflage for a conventional 
load, especially when the bank appoints the buyer as 
its agent to purchase commodities. 
3. Ijarah (operating lease) 
3.1. The bank owns or leases an asset from its owner. 
3.2. The bank leases or subleases the asset to a 
customer.  
3.3. The customer makes regular rental payments that 
cover usufruct. 
3.4. The customer is responsible for regular 
maintenance while the bank is responsible for major 
maintenance. 
3.5. Destruction of the leased asset terminates the 
lease. 
4. Ijarah Muntahia Bettamleek (financial Ijarah, where the 
title to the leased asset is gradually transferred in 
tranches to the lessee) 
4.1. The bank acquires an asset 
4.2. It leases the asset to a customer, based on 
operating lease, with a stipulation that the customer 
purchases part of the title to the property every period, 
until the title is completely transferred to the customer 
within a certain date. 
4.3. Every period, the customer buys a prescribed part 
of the asset for an agreed price and pays for it. 
4.4. Title is transferred in part every period, but the 
asset remains mortgaged to the bank until final 
payment. 
4.5. In case of default, the part owned by the customer 
is sold to a third party for its market price. The lease of 
the remainder could be transferred to the new buyer. 
5. Istisna' (command to manufacture goods on 
specifications) 
5.1. A customer commands the bank to manufacture 
an asset with a detailed list of specifications, as a 
prelude to negotiate a price and terms of delivery. The 
price can be paid before, during or after manufacturing. 
5.2. Once price and delivery terms are agreed, the bank 
approaches a manufacturer with an Istisna' 
subcontract. 
5.3. Manufacturing is divided into stages. Each stage is 
verified through a consultant or the customer. Once a 
stage is verified, a part of the price is disbursed by the 
bank. 
5.4. After manufacturing is complete, the asset is 
handed down to the customer. 
5.5. This mode is free from information asymmetry and 
could be used in project finance and in conjunction 
with BOT contracts. 
6. Salam (deferred delivery sale, where price is paid upfront). 
6.1. A sale contract where the price is paid upfront and 
the commodity delivery is deferred. 
6.2. It is useful for financing agricultural produce, when 
the farmer requires finance of cropping. 
6.3. The mode is subject to information asymmetry, as 
money is given to the customer without further control 
from the bank side. 
6.4. When a bank uses Salam as a finance mode, it 
must arrange for selling the commodities before they 
are received. 
II. CUSTOMERS DEPOSITS IN ISLAMIC BANKING 
In addition to demand deposits, which are guaranteed but 
earn no return, Islamic banks also take saving and 
investment deposits. While the former can be augmented 
and withdrawn on short notice, the latter is provided for 
specific maturities.  Investment deposits are either general 
or restricted.  The former are grouped with bank equity in 
one pool and invested in several ways.  Each earns a 
proportional share of the net profit of the pool.  The latter 
are placed in specific investments chosen by respective 
depositors and earn a proportional share of the profit on 
their investment.   
In all cases, Islamic banks use the deposits they obtain to 
provide finance in the modes outlined above and get a 
proportion of the profit or a commission as a fee.   
Islamic banks get a proportion of the profit in compensation 
for their efforts; the profit-sharing ratio between each bank 
and its depositors must be therefore set at the outset. This 
is naturally determined by competition among banks, 
availability of investment opportunities and alternative 
investment outlets available outside banks.  However, the 
actual rate of return eventually paid out on Investment 
deposits is not predetermined.  It is closely linked to the 
performance of the real economy, as finance modes are 
generally directed to finance trade in commodities as well as 
the actual production processes.  It also depends upon the 
performance of individual banks in relation to the choice and 
management of investment. 
III. ISLAMIC NON-BANKING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
There can be a variety of non-banking financial institutions 
that mobilize funds without taking deposits and use Islamic 
finance modes to provide finance to entrepreneurs.  They 
mobilize funds through selling stocks, mutual shares, and a 
variety of instruments with a wide choice of risk sharing and 
maturities. 
Non-banking financial institutions have even greater 
flexibility to deal with equity and partnership than banks, as 
they are not encumbered with guaranteed demand deposits.  
The advantages of financing working capital requirements to 
enterprises in which they hold equity can therefore be more 
pronounced than in universal banking.    
IV. ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 
Financial instruments play an important role in reducing 
transactions costs for both savers and investors.  As they 
can be tailored to the tastes and requirements of both 
parties, they can drastically reduce the cost of negotiating 
terms related to size, maturity, profit-sharing formula, risk 
profile and other relevant conditions (Al-Jarhi, 1998).   
Financial instruments increase the reach of financial 
institutions to fund suppliers and users, enabling 
institutions to deal with large numbers of customers and 
thus realize significant economies of scale.  This reach factor 
manifests itself through the ability of trading instruments in 
primary and secondary markets.  In this regard, we can find 
two advantages of Islamic financial instruments over their 
traditional counterparts. 
First, in pricing their services, the issuers of Islamic financial 
instruments have wider latitude.  When dealing with savers 
and investors, they negotiate a profit share between zero and 
100.  Conventional security issuers, meanwhile, are bound 
to negotiate a small cut within the much narrower 
differential between the borrowing and lending rates.  Wider 
latitude enables financial intermediaries to be more effective 
in mobilizing resources on the one hand and attracting 
investors on the other.   
In a conventional economy, when intermediaries raise the 
rate of interest to mobilize more savings, they have to charge 
investors correspondingly higher rates of interest.  In Islamic 
finance, intermediaries can mobilize more savings by 
offering higher rates of profit sharing to savers; the profit 
here would be obtained from investment net of all costs 
including finance costs.  Meanwhile, they can entice more 
investment by offering investors higher profit share, that 
would implicitly mean lower finance costs.  In other words, 
attracting more saving does not conflict with enticing more 
investment in Islamic finance.  Islamic finance can therefore 
be said to have consistency of purpose that is missing in 
conventional finance17.  
It is rather interesting to conclude that financial 
intermediation in the non-banking sector would imply lower 
transactions costs and mobilize both savings and 
investment more effectively than conventional finance. 
Financial instruments can take the following forms: 
1. Shares in companies: 
Shares represent undivided common shares in firms’ net 
assets.  In order to be “Shari’ah compliant,” a firm has to be 
established for an acceptable purpose.  It should not trade 
in or produce goods prohibited by Shari’ah.  It must not deal 
with conventional finance.  
Since such companies are rarely found, Shari’ah scholars 
have set some tolerable levels of impermissible activities.  
Such guidelines are considered transitory; to be modified as 
more Shari’ah-compliant companies are established.  
2. Sukuk 
Sukuk are undivided common shares titles to real assets, 
usufruct, commodities.   They can be issued for the purpose 
of securitizing a bunch of assets, for example leased real 
estate, machinery, equipment or even projects.  Sukuk 
holders must be the true owners of common shares in the 
securitized bunch.  The securitized basket can also include 
receivables from Shari’ah compliant activities, debt created 
through commodity finance and cash.  However, tolerance 
levels of such monetary assets must be observed. 
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hand and discourages savings on the other. 
3. Other Islamic financial instruments 
Shari’ah-compliant fund certificates, syndicated finance 
certificates as well as any Shari’ah-compliant investment 
can be securitized into certificates and traded, provided it 
does not involve the sale of present against future money. 
V. RULES OF TRADING IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Sale and purchase of financial instruments is subject to the 
same Shari’ah rules applied to the   sale contract.   
1. Each a sale contract must have a number of pillars, the 
buyer, the seller, free will of both, the price and the sold 
item. Sold items must be legitimate property, i.e., assets 
considered lawful to own by Shari’ah, which excludes 
liquor, tobacco, narcotics, pork, illegal weapons, services 
involving pornography and human trafficking. 
2. one of the two countervalues (payment of price and 
delivery of goods) but not both can be deferred, excluding 
futures. 
3. Risk trading, like derivatives, is prohibited. 
To investigate the rationale of Islamic finance, we ignore the 
moral justifications for the prohibition of interest, and focus 
on the economic consequences of its implementation. 
APPENDIX II: ISSUES RELATED TO UNIVERSAL 
BANKING 
The following lists major pro and con arguments related to 
universal banks’ ability to deal with moral hazard and 
adverse selection.  
I. ALTERATION OF CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
IN FAVOR OF DEBT AND AGAINST EQUITY  
Universal banks can facilitate access to information about 
firms. German universal banks are described as financial 
supermarkets providing commercial banking, securities 
underwriting, and brokerage, holding positions on the 
supervisory boards of joint-stock companies, voting equity 
shares in proxy for customers, and sometimes taking short-
term stakes in companies (Fohlin, 2000b). Theoretically, the 
presence of universal banking and the resulting bank 
attachments with corporations, could therefore give some 
firms more access to external finance thereby motivating 
them to change their preferences regarding debt finance. 
Fohlin (2000b) found that, universal banking is not 
associated with different leverage nor debt maturity 
structure. While older firms continue to have lower leverage 
and short-term debt, bank attachment is not associated with 
earlier than average reductions in leverage as firms mature 
or with alterations in the predictors of short-term debt use. 
The findings offer little support for the idea that formal bank-
firm relationships altered the financing options or choices of 
German industrial firms.   
II. COMBINING BANKING WITH TRADE 
Barth, Caprio and Levine’s (2000) empirical study highlights 
the negative implications of imposing regulatory restrictions 
on the activities of commercial banks. Specifically, 
regulations that restrict the ability of banks to (a) engage in 
securities activities and (b) own non-financial firms are 
closely associated with greater banking sector instability. 
Their analyses, moreover, suggest no countervailing positive 
benefits from restricting the mixing of banking and 
commerce or from restricting the activities of banks in the 
areas of investment banking, insurance, and real estate. 
III. BANK RELATIONSHIP AND FIRM PROFITABILITY 
Under universal banking, firms deal with one bank, which is 
also one of its shareholders.  Some economists suspects that 
such single firm-bank relationship could be less profitable. 
Degryse, Hans and Steven Ongena (2000) empirical work 
suggests that the profitability of Norwegian publicly listed 
firms with bilateral bank relationships is higher than the 
profitability of firms with multilateral relationships. This 
result is quite robust. It holds, controlling for firm age, size, 
debt, asset intangibility, and Tobin’s Q and in a variety of 
specifications. The result seems confirm an implication of 
Yosha (1995) and von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998). If 
firms disclose proprietary information to creditors, firms 
using bilateral financing achieve higher sales profitability 
than those using multilateral financing. 
IV. THE ORGAN BANK HYPOTHESIS 
The “Organ Bank Hypothesis,” advanced first by the 
Japanese Economist T. Kato and tested later by Okazaki and 
Yokoyama (2001), claims that the bank-firm relationship 
could reflect negatively on the efficiency and stability of the 
banking system.    Okazaki and Yokoyama have found that 
in prewar Japan that interlocking directorship and auditing 
between banks and non-banking companies to be very 
pervasive and more so in large size banks.  They also found 
that interlocking had negative influence on banks liquidity 
performance and profitability which played a role in 
increasing bank closures during the Showa Financial Crises 
of 1927. 
In contrast, when studying the German universal banking 
system in the pre-World War I period, in comparison with 
the banking system prevailing in the UK and the USA, Fohlin 
(2000a) finds a different perspective. Her results indicate 
that universality does not lead to appreciable market power. 
Concentration in the German banking industry does not in 
itself produce anti-competitive behavior.  
We can therefore conclude that other reasons may explain 
the Japanese case, and the Organ Bank Hypothesis is by no 
means generally valid. 
V. THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST HYPOTHESIS 
Gorton and Schmidt (1996) consider universal banking to be 
an alternative mechanism to stock market for risk sharing 
that could provide information to guide investment.  In 
Germany, the stock market has been historically small.  
Universal banks hold equity as well as proxy voting rights 
over their customers’ stock holdings.  They lend to firms and 
sit on their corporate boards simultaneously.  If German 
banks were acting as substitutes to the stock market, their 
behavior would improve corporate performance.  
Alternatively, banks could benefit from the inside 
information they gather about the firms they lend while 
exercising monopolistic power over access to external 
finance.  This would lead to conflict of interest between 
banks and other shareholders, particularly those who have 
delegated their voting proxy rights.   
Gorton and Schmidt (1996) test the conflict-of-interest 
hypothesis between German banks during the 1970s and 
1980s.  They find that German banks improved the 
performance of firms they finance to the extent of their 
equity holdings.  No evidence was found on the conflict of 
interest concerning the use of proxy votes.  This was the case 
in their sample of 1974.  In 1985, German security markets 
became more developed.  While banks continued to affect 
corporate performance, their influence could not be 
distinguished from that of non-bank shareholders. The 
study of Gorton and Schmidt appears to cast substantial 
doubt on the conflict-of-interest hypothesis. 
Gorton and Schmidt (1996) investigate the potential conflict 
of interest in the issuance of public securities when the 
underwriting of the initial offering is done by an investment 
bank that holds equity in the concerned firm who would be 
similar to a universal bank.  The evidence in their study 
suggests that the conflict of interest does exist, i. e., the 
underwriting bank is able to utilize the superior information 
it obtains through its affiliation with the firm.  Yet, the effects 
of the conflict of interest are fully discounted, as they are 
fully anticipated by all market participants.  In this regard, 
Gorton and Schmidt find that initial public offering 
underwritten for a firm by its affiliated investment bank 
performs as well or better than issues of firms in which no 
investment bank holds a prior equity position.  
VI. BANK CONCENTRATION AND CONCENTRATION IN 
THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
In the European experience, concentration in universal 
banking was often associated with concentration in the 
industrial sector.  Da Rin and Hellmann (2001) consider that 
in their big-push model the issue of concentration18.  They 
theorize that universal banks start with financing pioneers 
in their own industries.  Then, they continue to finance 
                             
18 For other models on the ills of market power in financial markets, see Hart (1983) or 
Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1997). 
incumbents. They conclude that large and powerful banks 
have a vested interest in preserving industrial monopolies.  
However, universal banks need to be powerful and large to 
succeed in limiting entry into the financial market.  They 
also need either the outright support of government 
translated into regulations or at least their acquiescence.   
VII. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The fact that universal banks sit on boards of firms they 
finance and have power that may exceed what would be 
commensurate with their own equity holdings could create 
problems of corporate governance.  First, to internalize the 
privileges usually accorded to board members, universal 
banks management would tend to appoint representatives 
to boards from within the narrowest circle of top 
management.  Eventually, the few members of top 
management find themselves overloaded the job of 
monitoring the performance of too many banks.  That would 
make monitoring much less effective. 
Second, members of universal banks top management may 
not have the necessary knowledge and skills to exercise 
monitoring effectively.  Third, as they are top management 
members, their reporting on the board meetings they attend 
may turn to be too brief and non-technical for technicians 
whose job is limited to desk-type follow-up to draw the right 
conclusions at the right time.  
All the above problems would be easily avoided by 
regulations and supervision.  Simple rules setting the proper 
qualifications of banks representatives on the boards, 
putting a ceiling on the number of board membership and 
perhaps prohibiting top management from taking board 
membership outside their banks would certainly ameliorate 
the situation. 
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